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KEITH KEPLINGER"

The Economics of Total Maximum
Daily Loads
ABSTRACT
This article begins by exploring the institutional and historical
forces shaping the total maximum daily load (TMDL) approach
from an economic perspective. Next, it discusses the suitability of
applying various types of economic analyses and policy
instruments to individual TMDLs or the TMDL program. Costeffectiveness analysis is shown to be particularlyamenable to and
appropriatefor application to individual TMDLs while pollution
trading may offer a mechanism for achieving water quality goals
at lower cost. The final section of the article presents a case study
that documents a formal application of economic analyses to an
actual TMDL.
INTRODUCTION
The role and relevancy of economic analysis as a tool in total
maximum daily load (TDML) allocation and implementation is receiving
growing attention. In rapid fashion, the TMDL program has become a
premiere water quality program in the United States while the field of
environmental economics has blossomed. These combined forces have
promoted greater public and governmental consideration of integrating
cost-effective and market-based solutions into TMDL deliberations.
Nonetheless, economic analysis is rarely incorporated into TMDLs at
more than a cursory level. Thus, there is considerable potential for
improvement in the economic performance of TMDLs.
TMDLs are numerical statements of maximum pollutant loads
that are deemed consistent with a water body's designated uses. Section

* Keith Keplinger is a research economist and adjunct faculty member at Texas
Institute for Applied Environmental Research (TIAER), Tarleton State University, Box T0410, Stephenville, TX 76402; keplinger@tiaer.tarleton.edu, where his research focuses on
economic and policy aspects of water pollution and animal waste management issues.
Funding for this research was provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Office of Policy Development, cooperating agreement number R-82680701-5. The author
gratefully acknowledges editorial reviews by Clay Ogg, EPA, and Ron Jones, Larry Hauck,
and Jim Vergura, all from TIAER.
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303(d) of the Clean Water Act' stipulates that states must establish
TMDLs for those waters not meeting applicable water quality standards.
States are subsequently required to develop implementation plans
detailing how TMDLs can be achieved. Allocation of pollutant loads
among dischargers involves important economic efficiency implications.
In most cases, there are alternative strategies and load allocations that
will achieve a TMDL. Failure to choose an economically efficient strategy
means that a higher cost than necessary will be paid to achieve a TMDL,
thus placing undue economic burden on society.
This article begins by exploring the institutional and historical
forces shaping the TMDL approach from an economic perspective. The
suitability of applying various types of economic analyses and policy
instruments to individual TMDLs or the TMDL program, generally, is
next discussed. The final section of the article presents a case study
documenting a formal application of an economic analysis to an actual
TMDL.
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Since 1972, the landmark Clean Water Act (CWA) and
subsequent amendments have dominated the institutional landscape of
water quality regulation in the United States. Although not completely
absent, references to costs or benefits in the CWA are few. The major
regulatory mechanism of the CWA, the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES), focused on the technical feasibility of
achieving effluent standards as the primary factor in establishing
pollution controls in contrast to former clean water legislation, with its
emphasis on state-administered ambient standards.
During debate of the 1972 amendments, classic economic
arguments were put forth in favor of ambient-based water quality
legislation.2 Countering this line of argument was a consensus, which
1. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). In 1977,
Congress formally recognized the common nomenclature, "Clean Water Act." The 1972
Clean Water Act and subsequent amendments are collectively referred to as the CWA or
"the Act" in this article.
2. For example, in House testimony, the Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisors (CEA) stated,
CEA is in agreement with the use of water quality targets appropriate to
the conditions and expected uses of water in particular areas of the
country. That is basic to the concept of relating the costs of programs to the
benefits received from them. To abandon that concept for a nationally
legislated standard which focuses on the level of pollutants removed and
is unrelated to water quality uses and standards is economically unwise
because it means a necessary misallocation of our inevitably scarce
economic resources.
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ultimately prevailed, that the former state-based ambient approach had
been given ample time to succeed but had overwhelmingly failed.3 Apart
from differences in scientific approaches, perhaps the strongest
argument in favor of NPDES, versus the former state-based legislation,
was that only strong federal control could force states to cleanse their
waters. Thus, despite some economic and scientific misgivings of the
prescriptive NPDES approach, it was at least viewed as an approach that
could be effectively implemented and would actually produce cleaner
water, the benefits of which were, presumably, greater than the
administrative and social costs of the program.4 Yet despite the
committed implementation of NPDES, standards were often not met,
due in large part to unregulated nonpoint source pollution! Although
section 303(d) of the CWA (the legislation establishing the TMDL
program) was largely ignored for the first two decades after passage of
the Act, a series of lawsuits starting in the 1980s forced both the states
and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to prepare for an
impending tidal wave of TMDL activity. In 2001, state lists indicated
about 21,000 impaired water bodies requiring in excess of 40,000
TMDLs, 6 and these numbers have continued to grow. These figures
suggest that the TMDL process will continue as a keystone water quality
control program for decades to come.
Was the abandonment of ambient standards irrational? Is the
return to ambient standards in the form of TMDLs a prescription for
inaction? I will argue that these developments in water quality policy
can be viewed as progress toward a more economically rational and
effective system of water quality control. Two reasons often provided for
the failure of pre-1972 ambient-based water quality legislation are (1) the

Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs: The Resurrection of Water Quality Standards-BasedRegulation Under
the Clean Water Act, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,329, 10,334 (1997) (citing Water Pollution Control
Legislation-1971:Hearingson H.R. 11,896, H.R. 11,895: Before the Comm. on Public Works, 92d
Cong. 483 (1971)).
3. See, e.g., id. at 10,335.
4. The interjection of economic (or cost) considerations into CWA deliberations, in
fact, was viewed as anathema by environmentalists and a large portion of the American
public, thus adding to the appeal of the more direct NPDES approach. Economist Wallace
Oates recounts, "Environmentalists... flatly rejected an economic approach (as I learned
personally and painfully on several occasions) and called for direct controls on polluting
activities." Wallace E. Oates, Forty Years in an Emerging Field, 137 RESOURCES 8, 9 (1999).
5. It is important to note, however, that the NPDES program is overwhelmingly
regarded as a success in controlling point source pollution and that it was never intended
to control nonpoint sources.

6. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL COMM. TO ASSESS THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF THE TOTAL
MAXiMUM DAILY LOAD APPROACH TO WATER POLLUTION REDUCTION, ASSESSING THE TMDL
APPROACH TO WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT, 2 (2001).
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inadequate state of science and technology7 and (2) the unwillingness or
lethargy of states in implementing and enforcing state standards. Neither
of these conditions, however, implicates the ambient-based approach per
se or in principal, when the conditions are ripe.' State inaction was
addressed by the partial federalization of water pollution control,' and,
although still challenged,'0 the nation is clearly better prepared today
than 30 years ago to take on the enormous scientific endeavor required to
support TMDLs. 1'
Economists acknowledge that techniques for calculating costs
and benefits in a real world setting were inadequately developed at the
time of the CWA deliberation. 12 The relative immaturity of the
environmental sciences and environmental economics, thus, provide
rationale for the subordination of the ambient-based water quality
approach in favor of effluent standards. While economic theory might
rate the ambient approach as a "first best" solution, the theoretically
"second best," 3 effluent approach, was viewed as a solution that at least

7. It is now widely acknowledged that the data, science, and analytical capabilities
needed to support ambient-based water quality control for thousands of interconnected
waterways were lacking in the 1960s and early 1970s, e.g., a committee appointed by the
National Science Foundation concluded, "The 303d focus on ambient water quality
standards has returned the nation to a water quality program that was not considered
implementable 35 years ago when there was a paucity of data and analytical tools for
determining causes of impairment and assigning responsibility to various sources." Id. at
16.
8. Tietenberg concludes that "the wrong inference was drawn from the early lack of
legislative success [in achieving water quality]." THOMAS H. TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL
AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 489 (3d ed. 1992).
9. Although the EPA was given ultimate responsibility for enforcing TMDLs or
conducting them if states failed, states were required to list waters and conduct and
implement TMDLs. Some analysts are skeptical that this partial federalization will work.
See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs III: A New Frameworkfor the Clean Water Act's Ambient
StandardsProgram, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,415, 10,436 (1998).
10. A recent GAO report seriously questions whether the data and science needed to
conduct TMDLs are adequate even today. A mail survey sent to water quality
administrators of 50 states indicated that a majority of states lacked the data they needed to
manage ambient water quality. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/RCED-00-54,
WATER QUALITY: KEY EPA AND STATE
INCOMPLETE DATA 44 (2000); see generally id.

DECISIONS LIMITED

BY INCONSISTENT

AND

11. While recognizing lawmakers' concern over the "paucity of data and information
available to the states...[to] meet water quality standards," a committee appointed by the
National Research Council concluded that "the data and science have progressed
sufficiently over the past 35 years to support the nation's return to ambient-based water
quality management." NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 2, 3.
12. See Oates, supra note 4, at 9.
13. A first best solution maximizes social welfare but ignores transactions costs and
implementation issues. A second best solution maximizes social welfare under a
constraining set of social or administrative limitations.
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given the existing development of the
could be effectively implemented,
4
sciences and technology.1
A final argument can be added in support of the economic
rationality of focusing on effluent standards first, then turning to
ambient standards after effluent standards have been fully implemented.
Apart from implementation costs, the time, effort, and expertise required
to conduct individual TMDLs "worth their salt" are undoubtedly more
costly than promulgating and enforcing across-the-board national
effluent standards.'5 Taking all factors into consideration, particularly
transactions costs, a simple, across-the-board, low-cost system can be
more cost-effective than a complex site-specific approach.' 6 In cases
where additional progress is required, however, a site-specific approach
allowing greater flexibility of design and implementation may be
required. 7 By way of analogy, ordinary detergent, generally applied,
gets the bulk of the wash clean, while spot remover and additional
scrubbing are reserved for the tough stains. Thus, while a variety of
views exists regarding the rationality and effectiveness of CWA
legislation,' 8 there is considerable support for the premise that the initial
abandonment and subsequent return to ambient standards in the form of
TMDLs was, in the main, very consistent with economic rationality.
AN ECONOMIC CHARACTERIZATION OF WATER QUALITY
Water pollution is a classic externality produced by various
types of economic activity. An industrial facility, for example, may
14. Ackerman and Stewart, while strongly supporting market incentives, concede that
the prescriptive Best Available Technology (BAT) approach "made some sense as a crude
first-generation strategy." Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL.L. 171, 199 (1988).
15. The costs, difficulties, and complexity of conducting as well as implementing
TMDLs is often cited as a top concern in assessing the wisdom of heading down the TMDL
path. See, e.g., Tara Hun, Costs, Nonpoint Sources Are Top TMDL Concerns, 10 WATER ENv'T &
TECH. 36, 36-37 (1998). An EPA study of development costs for 14 TMDLs reported total
costs ranging from $4039 to $1,024,000. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PUB. NO. EPA-R-96-001,
TMDL DEVELOPMENT COST ESTIMATES: CASE STUDIES OF 14 TMDLS 12-14 (1996).

16. Providing some economic rationale for simple rules, economist Davidson writes, "I
think the simple rule of requiring everyone to drive on the right side of the road results in a
fairly optimal system, and offhand I cannot suggest a cost incentive system that would be
as effective and simple. Hence we should not neglect the possibility of simple rules in our
search for offsetting some types of externalities." Paul Davidson, The Valuation of Public
Goods, in ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT: SELECTED READINGS 345, 354 n.12 (Robert
Dorfman & Nancy S. Dorfman eds., 1972).
17. Boyd points out, "The low-hanging fruit of low-cost high-volume point source
controls has been harvested. Today, significant water quality improvement requires the
expansion of controls to nonpoint sources." Jim Boyd, Unleashing the Clean Water Act: The
Promiseand Challengeof the TMDL Approach to Water Quality, 139 RESOURCES 7, 8 (2000).
18. See, e.g., Houck, supranote 2; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6.
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discharge toxic effluent into a river causing fish kills and environmental
impairment downstream. Because the fishermen and recreationists that
suffer harm are not parties to the plant's decision to discharge, that harm
is external to the decision process. Another key feature of water
pollution is that, in almost all cases, it harms multiple users and
nonusers simultaneously and, hence, is a public bad. From the reverse
perspective, clean water is a public good producing benefits to large
groups of users but requiring costs for its attainment. The externality and
public goods nature of water quality, as for other environmental media
(air, land), often lead to market failure: a situation where exclusive
reliance on market forces does not result in socially desirable outcomes.
The major causes for market failure in water quality are undefined water
quality rights and control obligations and the practical obstacles that
discourage numerous individuals, receiving relatively modest water
quality benefits, from coordinating their efforts and directly contracting
with dischargers. Societies have sought to correct market failures
through various forms of social intervention. 19
COMPONENTS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Two fundamental building blocks of applied microeconomic
analyses are costs and benefits. Water pollution control involves
economic sacrifices or costs for some groups (mainly the owners of
production or industry) while benefiting others (generally, the public).
Alternatively, water pollution imposes costs on the public while
providing benefits to industry. The following sections discuss costs and
benefits from a water quality versus a water pollution perspective, e.g.,
costs refer to the control of attaining water quality while the benefits
refer to the benefits derived from water quality.
Costs
Due to constraints imposed by nature and technology,
producing more of one good, including water quality, is typically
accomplished only at the expense of producing less of other goods.
Occasionally, analyses suggest that water quality control measures may
also result in net benefits to dischargers. Such "win-win" solutions are
the exception but might occur if (1) current technology and resources are
not being efficiently utilized or (2) recent technology has expanded
opportunities for improving water quality while simultaneously
19. While not exhaustive, alternative externality correction devices include market
emergence, merger, economic incentives, regulation, prohibition, pseudo markets, and
moral suasion.
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producing economic benefits. Numerous water pollution control
measures have been identified for municipalities, industry, and
agriculture. The costs of implementing these measures are often
estimated and typically expressed in monetary units, e.g., dollars, which
represent the foregone opportunity of producing and consuming other
goods.
Benefits
The benefits of water quality can be classified as environmental
and economic. Environmental benefits are measured by indices such as
biological diversity, increased fish populations, etc. Economic benefits
are the monetary values society places on water quality benefits, often
measured by society's willingness to pay for the associated
environmental benefits. Water quality benefits include improvements in
(1) recreation (swimming, fishing, boating, water fowl hunting), (2)
nonuser benefits (amenity, aesthetic, and ecological benefits not directly
associated with activities on or near a water body but for which
households may be willing to pay), (3) diversionary uses (reducing risk
to human health and decreased costs for municipal water supplies), and
(4) commercial fisheries. 20 Many of the benefits listed above are
nonmarket, i.e., they are not purchased or sold and therefore have no
observable price. The lack of organized markets for water quality
complicates the estimation of water quality benefits, though a number of
indirect methods have been developed.
ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR ANALYZING WATER QUALITY
POLICY
Cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis are two
basic but well-worn tools in the economic analysis toolkit and both have
been applied extensively to water quality issues.
Cost-Benefit Analysis

21

Applied to water quality, cost-benefit analyses generally
estimate and compare both the economic costs and benefits of a water
quality initiative. Such analyses are, by their nature, prima facie
20. This etymology is based on A. MYRICK FREEMAN, III, AIR AND WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL: A BENEFIT-COST ASSESSMENT 9 (1982).
21. A general review of cost-benefit analysis and its applicability to environmental
regulation is provided in Scott Farrow & Michael Toman, Using Benefit-Cost Analysis to
Improve EnvironmentalRegulations, 41 ENV'T 12 (1999).
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prescriptive, i.e., benefits exceeding costs could be considered a sufficient
condition for proceeding with a project.2 In theory, the optimal level of
ambient water quality is such that the benefits produced by one
additional unit of water quality equal the costs for its attainment. Thus,
an assessment of the merits of a water quality project requires detailed
information on both its benefits and costs. Significant difficulties,
limitations, and complications inherent in environmental benefit
estimation, described later in this article, suggest one reason why costbenefit analysis, although theoretically appealing, has not factored more
prominently in the water quality policy arena and why such analyses,
when pursued, are seldom decisive.'
Four issues hamper cost-benefit analysis, particularly as applied
to environmental quality. First, in cases where benefits cannot be
adequately quantified because of uncertainty or other technical hurdles,
benefits can only be described. By contrast, estimating the costs of
structural or managerial pollution control measures is relatively
straightforward and generally involves much less uncertainty.
Comparing quantified costs to descriptive, though potentially large,
benefits can unduly discount benefits. 24 Second, the use of cost-benefit

22. A more exacting and universally accepted welfare economic criterion is the Pareto
criterion, which states that everyone should be made at least as well off while nobody is
made worse off. A policy producing net benefits (total benefits greater than total costs) is
considered a potential Pareto improvement since, in theory, the gains of the policy action
can be redistributed such that everyone is made at least as well off as before. In practice, a
strict Pareto improvement is difficult to achieve although efforts are often made to
compensate losers. Thus, a potential Pareto improvement, i.e., the generation of positive net
benefits, is often used as a theoretical decision rule.
23. It is noteworthy that authors of environmental economics textbooks, for the
reasons cited, often exhort students to be cautious in their interpretation of cost-benefit
analyses. See, e.g., JAMES R. KAHN, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL AND
NATURAL RESOURCES 120 (2d ed., 1998) ("Although cost-benefit analysis, with its reliance
on numbers and economic theory, may seem as if it might be a precise science, this is not
the case."); but see Hartwick and Olewiler, who maintain,
Cost benefit analysis has been maligned by those who say that it is useless
because the numbers are so bad. This criticism misses the point of the
exercise... .The estimate of the benefits of environmental control is crucial
if we are to evaluate the tremendous costs of reducing pollution and make
informed judgments about the social value of improving environmental
quality.
JOHN M. HARTWICK & NANCY D. OLEWILER, THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCE USE
432 (1986). A large burden is lifted off the shoulders of cost-benefit analysis by
characterizing it as a useful tool, rather than "a singleminded decision rule." Farrow &
Toman, supra note 21, at 37.
24. While broadly supporting an expanded use of cost-benefit analysis in
governmental decision making, a group of highly respected economists also highlighted
some of its limitations. One of many caveats was that "[clare should be taken to ensure that
quantitative factors do not dominate important qualitative factors in decisionmaking."
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analysis is often perceived to be subject to manipulation, or at least
highly subject to the analysts' biases, especially when gaps in knowledge
and sources of uncertainty are substantial.n Some studies, for instance,
have indicated that the non-use or existence value of environmental
amenities far outweighs their commercial and use value, while many
studies omit the estimation of these values altogether. Third, full-blown
cost-benefit analyses can be very expensive and time consuming.
Because of the site-specific nature of water quality benefits and costs, it
would cost billions of dollars to model them, even when many benefits
cannot be estimated adequately. Finally, for individual TMDL analyses,
environmental criteria rather than social valuations trigger TMDLs.
While considering the costs of TMDL implementation measures is
permitted, even endorsed, estimating benefits has no prima facie
relevancy within the TMDL framework.
Nonetheless, society must eventually decide if a project or
program is worth its cost. In recent years, Congress has called for a
26
greater use of cost-benefit analysis to justify major programs. Under
regulatory review provisions of Executive Order 12866,27 President
Clinton required the EPA to evaluate the costs and benefits of proposed
new rules. While the Executive Order strictly applies to direct costs
incurred by states to implement proposed changes in the TMDL rule,
EPA has also investigated the costs and benefits to all parties resulting
2
from implementation of the TMDL program. In state water quality

KENNETH J. ARROW ET AL., AM. ENTER. INST., BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL,

HEALTH, AND SAFETY REGULATION: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 2 (1996).
25. Recounting his experience as the senior economist for environmental and resource
policy at the Council of Economic Advisors, Jason Shogren comments: "But now I
understand that some people see our orthodoxy as not just simply confining but as
downright prehistoric... .Because after all, cost-benefit analysis is just naked self-interest
dressed up in banker's pajamas, isn't it?" Jason F. Shogren, Do All the Resource Problems in
the West Begin in the East?, 23 J.AGRIC. & RESOURCE EcON. 309, 311 (1998).
26. ARROW ET AL., supra note 24, at v.
27. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
28. Proposed rules elaborate:
In anticipation of the interest of diverse stakeholders, EPA has begun work
to gather information about the costs and benefits that can be expected to
result from implementation of the TMDL program. A key part of this
assessment is to better understand the costs and benefits of the existing
TMDL program, as well as the incremental costs and benefits that will
result from the changes to the TMDL program.
Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 64 Fed.
Reg. 46,012, 46,042 (Aug. 23, 1999) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 130) [hereinafter
Propposed TMDL Rule]. The final rule was due to become effective on April 30, 2003;
however, on December 27, 2002, EPA announced its intent to withdraw the proposed rule
and to issue a new rule in April 2003.
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reports, proposed TMDL rules also require estimating the costs and
benefits of measures needed to achieve CWA objectives.29
A committee assembled by the National Research Council to
assess the scientific basis of the TMDL approach to water quality
reduction suggested that estimating the economic benefits of pollution
reduction in relation to its costs would also be constructive in developing
appropriate use attainability analyses (UAAs) for individual water
bodies. States prepare such analyses to inform the process of assigning
designated uses to water bodies. In turn, water quality criteria are
designed to be protective of designated uses. UAAs, therefore, are
necessary precursors to assessing and listing waters and conducting
TMDLs. Until recently, however, little attention has been directed
toward developing appropriate UAAs. Addressing this shortfall, the
committee stated, "States should develop appropriate use designations
for waterbodies in advance of assessment and refine these use
designations prior to TMDL development. " 'o
In summary, cost-benefit analysis provides a formal mechanism
to determine whether a project or a program is worth its cost.
Unfortunately, estimating water quality benefits, as with other types of
environmental benefits, is difficult and controversial. Moreover,
estimating economic benefits has no regulatory relevancy for individual
TMDLs. Nonetheless, at a broader programmatic level, EPA is
investigating the costs and benefits of the entire TMDL program, and
evaluation of both costs and benefits is also recommended for UAAs.

29. "Each such report shall include.. .an estimate of the environmental, economic and
social costs and benefits needed to achieve the objectives of the CWA and an estimate of
the date of such achievement." Id. at 46,047.
30. COMMITTEE TO ASSESS THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF THE TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD
APPROACH TO WATER POLLUTION REDUCTION, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 4.

The Committee elaborates:
Appropriate use designation for a state's waterbodies is a policy decision
that can be informed by technical analysis. However, a final selection will
reflect a social consensus made in consideration of the current condition of
the watershed, its predisturbance condition, the advantages derived from
a certain designated use, and the costs of achieving the designated use.
Id. at 24.
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EstimatingBenefits3'
At least four linkages must be established and quantified to
estimate the economic benefits of water quality improvements: (1) the
32
link between water quality measures and impairment, (2) the link
between impairment and environmental benefits, (3) the translation of
environmental benefits into economic benefits, and (4) the link between
control measure implementation and water quality measures.
For example, phosphorus reduction technology at wastewater
treatment plants (a control measure) lowers discharge of phosphorus
into the receiving water body (e.g., a lake). This reduces ambient
phosphorus concentrations (a water quality measure). Reducing the
ambient phosphorus concentrations may reduce the incidence of algal
blooms, which depletes dissolved oxygen (an impairment). Avoiding
oxygen depletion, in turn, prevents fish kills (an environmental benefit).
The final step in economic benefits estimation involves determining the
level at which society values the avoidance of fish kills and other
33
improvements associated with reductions in algal blooms.
Estimating the relationships between each of these linkages
presents significant scientific challenges. The effects of a control measure
on a water quality indicator are often estimated by sophisticated
mechanistic water quality models. These models require specialized
training and many man-hours of labor for inputting data; calibrating,
validating, and running the model; and interpreting results. Equally
sophisticated models with biological components are sometimes
employed to estimate more direct impairment measures such as elevated
algal growth, as well as actual environmental benefits such as increased
fish populations or biological diversity. The final (and often most
controversial) step assigns a monetary value to the resulting economic
benefits.
31.

General reviews of benefits estimation techniques are provided by APOGEE

RESEARCH, INC., U.S. ARMY CORP OF ENGINEERS, PUB. No. IWR REPORT 96-R-24, MONETARY

MEASUREMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS AND SERVICES: FRAMEWORK AND SUMMARY OF
TECHNIQUES FOR CORPS PLANNERS (1996); FREEMAN, supra note 20, at 8-25; and in resource
and environmental economics textbooks, e.g., KAHN, supra note 23; HARTWICK & OLEWILER,
supra note 23; TIETENBERG, supra note 8. A more technical review is provided in MARC 0.
RIBAUDO & DANIEL HELLERSTEIN, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., PUB. No. TB-1808, ESTIMATING
WATER QUALITY BENEFITS: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES (1992).

32. Water quality measures are not necessarily directly related to impairment. Elevated
levels of ambient phosphorus in surface waters, for instance, result in impairment only
under certain conditions, i.e., when phosphorus is the limiting nutrient. On the other hand,
some water quality measures, such as heavy metals and ammonia, more directly measure
impairment.
33. Algal blooms in surface waters can also cause unpleasant odor, interference with
boating and other water sports, reduced visual aesthetics, and unpleasant tasting drinking
water.
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Where water pollution causes direct damage to a market
commodity resulting in either a decrease in production (e.g., fisheries) or
an increase in expense (e.g., increased treatment cost for municipal
drinking water), calculating the value of water quality improvements is
relatively straightforward. Unfortunately, many water quality benefits
are not so easily valued because they are both nonmarket and public
and, hence, do not reveal a market price.
Economists have developed a number of indirect methods for
estimating nonmarket values of water quality improvement. The
hedonistic technique is often used to estimate a lower bound on amenity
or aesthetic value. This technique infers the value of a nonmarket
commodity by analyzing the value of a commodity whose value is
influenced by the nonmarket commodity, e.g., comparing waterfront
property values across regions experiencing different levels of water
pollution. Differences in human behavior, e.g., increased recreation due
to water quality improvements, can also be used in conjunction with
travel cost models to estimate the value of recreational water quality
benefits. The travel cost model assumes that the willingness to pay for a
recreational trip is at least equal to the cost incurred in traveling to the
recreational site. Hedonic and travel cost models are revealed preference
methods because their estimation techniques depend on observable
(revealed) behavior.
If values for water quality are not closely related to use, e.g., the
desire to provide clean water environments to current and future
generations, they are not necessarily revealed through either changes in
market prices or by other aspects of human behavior, such as travel or
home location. Thus, observational methods alone may not reveal the
totality of nonuse valuations. Researchers have circumvented this hurdle
by describing hypothetical markets to respondents who are asked to
indicate their willingness to pay for a nonmarket commodity. This
relatively recent methodology has come to be known as the contingent
valuation (CV) method, because willingness to pay values are contingent
upon the particular hypothetical market described.m Since the situation is
hypothetical and an actual transaction or observable behavioral pattern
has not been affected, value estimates based on surveys are
controversial. Participants may answer strategically, e.g., may indicate
34. See generally ROBERT CAMERON MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS
TO VALUE PUBLIC GOODS: THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD (1989) (often considered

"the Bible" of CV analysis by its practitioners); a good summary is provided in JOSEPH
BREEDLOVE, NATURAL RESOURCES: ASSESSING NONMARKET VALUES THROUGH CONTINGENT
VALUATION (CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, PUB. No. RL30242, 1999); the CV method has also

been referred to as the survey method, the interview method, the direct interview method,
the direct questioning method, the hypothetical demand curve estimation method, the
difference-mapping method, and the preference elicitation method.
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too high a value because they think it will improve the chance that a
water quality improvement will be made, or indicate too low a value if
they think their reported willingness to pay might result in an increase in
taxes.n
The public goods nature of water quality improvements
complicates the analysis and adds to data collection expense.3 The value
of water quality improvements is typically spread across a wide
population, and researchers must determine the relevant population for
a particular improvement. Another obstacle in estimating nonmarket
benefits is that most people do not have well formed values on the vast
array of environmental resources and therefore resort to heuristics and
simple protocols to construct dollar value estimates. These protocols,
however, vary widely between individuals and many irrelevant issues,
such as the appropriateness of the payment vehicle, who should pay,
etc., often influence responses.3 7 A few experiments suggest that stated
willingness to pay for existence values may be two-to-ten times higher
than actual contributions or payments.3
Despite the theoretical and methodological difficulties, quantifying the benefits of achieving clean water has often changed the character
of the debate. 9 It is typical that the costs required to achieve water
quality are highly concentrated but benefits are widely distributed.
Because benefits to any one user may be quite small, only bearers of costs
would have a great incentive to change the outcome of a debate. Given
the public goods nature of many water quality improvements, a CV
may show that benefits, though widely dispersed, far outweigh
analysis
4
costs. 0
In sum, while certain benefits of water quality are reflected in
markets and are relatively easy to measure, many are not. The
nonmarket benefits of water quality are important and potentially very
large. Measuring these benefits, however, presents unique challenges,
which have been addressed by a number of ingenious nonmarket
35. For this reason, CV questionnaires often attempt to convince respondents that their
answers will have no effect on actual outcomes.
36. RIBAUDO & HELLERSTEIN, supranote 31, at 22-23.
37. David A. Schkade, Issues in the Valuation of Environmental Resources: A Perspective
from the Psychology of Decision Making, in U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, PUB. No. IWR
REPORT 95-R-2, REVIEW OF MONETARY AND NONMONETARY VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL

INVESTMENTS app. B (Timothy D. Feather et al. eds., 1995).
38. John B. Loomis, Use of Non-market Valuation Studies in Water Resource Management
Assessments, 109 WATER RES. UPDATE 5, 6 (1997). However, estimated use values for
hunting, fishing, rafting, camping, etc., employing CV willingness to pay results, were
generally found to be slightly less than estimates based on actual behavior methods, e.g.,
travel cost. Id.
39. See generally id.
40. Id.
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techniques, CV being among the most promising. The accuracy,
completeness, and potential bias of such techniques, especially CV,
remain contentious issues. Despite these challenges, estimating benefits
is an important element in the overall evaluation of the TMDL program
and for UAAs and is being pursued by the EPA."
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
Cost-effectiveness analysis circumvents the difficulty and
controversy of estimating economic benefits by focusing on the costs of
achieving a quantified non-economic objective. Once this objective, e.g., a
water quality measure, has been chosen, costs of alternative strategies
that reach the objective can be compared. Because estimating the cost of
water quality measures is more reliable than estimating the expected
benefits associated with those measures, cost-effectiveness analyses
generally engender less controversy than cost-benefit analyses.
Cost-effectiveness analyses estimate the costs and environmental
effectiveness of defined control measures or combinations of measures.
In the TMDL context, effectiveness is often measured as a reduction in
ambient pollutant load. Cost-effectiveness ratios are calculated by
dividing the cost of a control measure by its effectiveness. This ratio
yields the dollar cost of achieving a one-unit improvement in the
effectiveness measure. Cost-effectiveness ratios can easily be compared
across control measures to determine the most cost-effective measures,
i.e., those with the lowest ratios. To achieve a water quality target in
cases where any one control measure does not single-handedly achieve
the target, the most cost-effective solution is typically found by applying
the most cost-effective measure first, followed by the second most costeffective measure, etc., until a specified water quality target is reached.
Cost-effectiveness analysis is particularly well adapted to
informing the decision making process for individual TMDLs for the
following reasons: (1) numeric water quality targets are inherently part

41. "While the estimation of benefits is traditionally difficult, EPA is working to
develop improved models for describing benefits in both qualitative and quantitative
terms." Proposed TMDL Rule, supranote 28, at 46,043.
42. Cost-effectiveness ratios can also be calculated by dividing effectiveness by cost, in
which case, higher ratios would be preferable to lower ratios.
43. Cost-effectiveness ratio analysis, as outlined above, minimizes costs within the
limitations imposed by ratio analysis, e.g., linearity and additivity. Under more complex
(and realistic) assumptions, cost-effectiveness analysis requires more completely defined
relationships between costs, water quality indicators, and control measure adoption.
Complex relationships among varying levels and combinations of control measures can
often be addressed within a generalized cost minimization framework capable of solving
for cost minimizing levels of control measures.
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of the TMDL process;" (2) the particular means of attaining water quality
targets are not prescribed, allowing flexibility and the comparison of
alternative control measures; (3) descriptions of these control measures
and their effectiveness are also required elements in TMDL
implementation plans;*5 (4) considering implementation costs of
alternative control is not prohibited and, in fact, is encouraged;46 (5) from
a welfare economic perspective, minimizing or reducing the cost of
achieving water quality targets increases social welfare; and (6)
compared to cost-benefit analyses, cost-effectiveness analyses are
relatively straightforward and less controversial. Individual TMDL
assessments, thus, are natural candidates for the application of costeffectiveness analyses. Despite the suitability of cost-effectiveness
analysis within the TMDL framework, rigorous analyses have been
pursued for few TMDLs, and there remains a large potential for
improving the economic performance of TMDL allocations.
EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS
Equity considerations often take on large proportions within
TMDL deliberations because remedies are not prescribed but are the
product of a human decision-making process. In many cases, entities
belonging to different sectors, e.g., industrial, agricultural, and urban, are
jointly responsible for exceeding ambient standards. Reducing loads to
TMDL targets can be accomplished by any combination of control
measures, provided that total load reductions achieve the TMDL target.
Cost minimization can be used as the sole criterion for assigning loads,
but such assignments may be rejected because they are not deemed
44. Identification of pollutants and quantification of pollutant loads meeting water
quality standards is one of ten minimum elements required for TMDL submissions to EPA.
Proposed TMDL Rule, supra note 28 at 46,050; see also EPA, PUB. No. EPA 841-D-99-001,
DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR WATER QUALITY-BASED DECISIONS: THE TMDL PROCESS 3-3 (2d ed.
1999).
45. Proposed TMDL Rule, supra note 28, at 46,051; see also, EPA, supra note 44, at 3-22.
46. "TMDLs continue to provide for tradeoffs between alternative point and nonpoint
source control options so that cost effectiveness, technical effectiveness, and the social and
economic benefits of different allocations can be considered by decision-makers." Proposed
TMDL Rule, supra note 28, at 46,030; moreover, EPA has characterized the TMDL process
as a "cost-effective framework" for achieving water quality; Letter from Charles J. Fox,
Asst. Administrator, EPA, to The Honorable Bud Shuster, Chairman of the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 5, 2000)
(on file with author). EPA also explicitly and repeatedly refers to the legitimacy of
employing cost-effectiveness in assessing control measures in its Draft Guidance, e.g., "The
TMDL process allows for alternative point and nonpoint source control strategies that
provide decision makers with an opportunity to compare the cost-effectiveness and
efficiency of different pollutant reduction activities or controls and the social and economic
benefits of alternative allocation approaches." EPA, supra note 44, at 1-3.
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equitable. The flexibility of the TMDL approach, thus, creates challenges
to developing implementation plans that are deemed equitable to all
parties, and, if allocations acceptable to all parties are found, these allocations may compromise economic efficiency.
Control costs are often concentrated in particular industrial
sectors or entities. The fairness of how to assign these costs is almost
always a contentious issue within TMDL deliberations. Subsidizing
water quality improvements by transferring control costs from a small
group of dischargers to broader publics is often viewed as an equitable
means of distributing costs. State and federal funds can often be tapped
to defray expenses associated with new control obligations. 7 Such
transfers can promote the acceptance of new controls. When such
funding is not available, the legality of mandating new control
obligations, especially for nonpoint sources, is often tested.
Equity criteria can be analyzed by rigorous analytical methods,
such as the attainment of a Pareto improvement.8 In practice, however,
equity issues are almost always dealt with in a subjective manner. Public
participation forums within the TMDL process often provide official
avenues through which equity issues are addressed. 9 Although load
allocations are ultimately assigned and approved by state EPAs, most
states assemble advisory boards of watershed stakeholders, typically
composed of public servants, environmental interests, and industry
representatives, to recommend key TMDL decisions, including load
allocations. Recommended load assignments, thus, can be viewed as a
product of internal political dynamics among advisory board members
representing various interests. Within this context, appeals to equity and
47. A prime example is the Natural Resources Conservation Service's Environmental
Quality Incentive Program (EQIP), which provides up to a 75 percent cost share to
agricultural producers for implementing practices that enhance environmental quality. See
NAT. RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERV., ENVT'L QUALITY INCENTIVES PROGRAM FACT SHEET,
June 2003, at http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/farmbill/2002/pdf/EQIPFct.pdf (last
visited Sept. 24,2003).
48. Within a TMDL context, a Pareto improvement would necessitate transfers from
the public (beneficiaries) to entities assigned control obligations such that all parties are at
least as well off as before (see supra note 22).
49. The public participation process is an important aspect of the TMDL process and is
strongly encouraged by EPA. Supra note 44, at 1-10 and 3-34-3-36.
Historically, the EPA's policy has been that there should be full and
meaningful public participation at the States, Territories and authorized
Tribes level in both the listing and TMDL development processes. As such,
EPA has encouraged States, Territories and authorized Tribes to carry out
public participation consistent with their own public participation
requirements.
Proposed TMDL Rule, supra note 28, at 46,038; the proposed regulation also requires that
states provide the public with at least 30 days to review and comment on TMDLs,
including allocations prior to submission to EPA. Id.; EPA, supra note 44, at 1-10.
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fairness are perhaps the most potent and effective forms of persuasion
influencing advisory board recommendations.
Any number of subjective criteria may be proposed to guide
TMDL load allocations. ° It may be deemed equitable for each identified
source, or group of sources, to reduce their water quality impact by
roughly the same percentage or absolute amount. Imposing pollution
reduction obligations on small businesses and family farms, especially
when economic viability is jeopardized, may be deemed unfair, as well
as politically infeasible. While implementation strategies deemed
equitable may significantly depart from cost-effective allocations,
correctly structured incentive-based mechanisms potentially overcome
this shortcoming.
POLICY INSTRUMENTS
Poor water quality is symptomatic of market failure, providing a
rationale for collective intervention. This intervention can take the form
of direct regulation, prohibition, or one of a variety of incentive-based
mechanisms. Complete prohibition of discharge is sometimes resorted to
in the case of extremely toxic substances, where even very small amounts
might cause harm. Regulatory approaches typically prescribe specific
control remedies and allow little flexibility in the means of achieving
goals. By contrast, incentive-based regulation encourages behavior that
reduces pollution through market forces and signals, allowing at least
some degree of flexibility in the means of achieving goals. This flexibility
provides opportunity for cost savings.
The NPDES permit system for point sources, which bases
acceptable discharges on best available technology, is a prime example of
a regulatory approach. Criticisms regarding the regulatory approach in
general, and NPDES in particular, focus on issues of economic efficiency,
e.g., that it is overly prescriptive and lacks flexibility; that it seeks to
regulate inputs rather than outputs (water quality); that it does not
adequately consider costs; and even that it has reduced real incomes."
These criticisms help explain the recent rise to prominence of incentivebased regulatory approaches.
50. In its Draft Guidance, EPA proposes several possible allocation methods: equal
percent removal; equal concentrations; equal total mass per day, month, or year; equal
reduction of raw load; equal ambient mean annual quality (mg/); equal cost per mass of
pollutant removed; percent removal proportional to raw load per day, month, year; most
significant contributors achieve higher removal rates; seasonal limits based on costeffectiveness analysis; and minimum total treatment cost. EPA, supra note 44, at 3-14
51. E.g., Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Clean Water Legislation: Reauthorize or
Repeal?, in TAING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle eds.,
1993); Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 14.
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Incentive-Based Mechanisms
Incentive-based mechanisms are advocated primarily as a means
of reducing the financial burden of control costs while maintaining or
making further progress on water quality. The defining hallmark of
incentive-based systems is that they are designed to be incentive
compatible, i.e., by pursuing self-interests, environmental goals are
simultaneously achieved. Unlike prescriptive regulation, incentive-based
mechanisms can also promote the development and implementation of
new pollution control technology.
Because of their theoretical efficiency characteristics, incentivebased mechanisms for achieving environmental quality have attracted
the interest of economists for at least the past several decades. More
recently, they have achieved a prominent place among the tools used by
federal and state governments to address environmental problems.
Although historically shunned, incentive-based mechanisms have also
gained the support of some environmental organizations.53
The theoretical appeal of incentive-based mechanisms is their
potential to improve economic efficiency, i.e., the same amount of
pollution reduction can be obtained for a lower cost or a greater amount
of pollution reduction can be attained at no greater cost. While generally
viewed as a cost savings measure, making pollution control more affordable can also enhance its political acceptability and, hence, promote
additional pollution controlU" Incentive-based mechanisms for
improving environmental quality include emission fees or taxes, tradable
permits, deposit-refund systems, subsidies for pollution control, removal
of subsidies with negative environmental impacts, reductions in market
barriers, and performance standards.55 The potential of the two most

52. EPA, PUB. No. EPA-240-R-01-001 (2001), THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE WITH
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 1, available at http://
yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eermfile.nsf/vwAN/EE-0216B-01 .pdf/$File/EE-0216B-Ol.pdf
(last visited Sept. 25, 2003).
53. See generally Oates, supra note 4; examples from the environmental community
include Paul Faeth, Market based Incentives and Water Quality (World Resources Institute,
Oct. 1999), at http://www.wri.org/incentives/faeth.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2003);
ENvTL. DEFENSE FUND, FROM OBSTACLE TO OPPORTUNITY: How ACID RAIN EMISSIONS
TRADING IS DELIVERING CLEANER AIR (2000), at http://www.environmentaldefense.org/

documents/645_SO2.pdf (last visited Sept. 25,2003).
54. Tietenberg, for instance, maintains that "[w]ith the inclusion of a tradable permits
program for sulfur in the [acid rain bill], the compliance cost was reduced sufficiently to
make passage politically possible." Tom Tietenberg, Tradable Permit Approaches to Pollution
Control: Faustian Bargain or Paradise Regained?, in PROPERTY RIGHTS, ECONOMICS, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 1-4 (Michael D. Kaplowitz ed., 1999).
55. See generally Robert W. Hahn, The Impact of Economics on Environmental Policy, 39 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 375 (2000); Robert N. Stavins, Market Based Environmental Policies,

Fall 20031

TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS

1075

prominent incentive-based mechanisms (pollution taxes and tradable
permits) to meet TMDL objectives are investigated below.
Pollution Taxes
Economists have long recognized the allocational inefficiencies
associated with environmental externalities. Prior to World War II, the
noted economist Arthur Cecil Pigou recognized that when there are
divergences between private and social costs, self interest will not lead to
maximum social welfare and consequently "certain specific acts of
interference with normal economic processes may be expected, not to
diminish, but to increase the dividend."5 Pigou proposed an externality
tax on pollution to internalize the damages caused by pollution. During
his time, Pigou's pollution tax was regarded as an academic exercise and
did not gain practical significance. The environmental consciousness of
the 1970s, however, spurred a revival of interest in pollution taxes as a
solution to environmental externalities, and several European countries
and Japan adopted pollution taxes. The consensus among economists is
that these fees have typically not had noticeable effects on pollution
because they have not been set at levels that affect behavior.57
A simple economic model of water quality provision suggests
that pollution taxes or tradable permits within a cap yield identical
results if the cap or tax is appropriately set. This conclusion is illustrated
by a simple graphic where water quality is represented on the horizontal
axis, control cost is represented on the vertical axis, and an increasing
marginal cost of water quality (a water quality supply function) is
plotted within the graph (Figure 1).- A second horizontal axis depicts the
inverse relationship between water quality and pollution.

(Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 98-26, Mar. 1998), available at http://www.rff.
org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-98-(1998) (last visited Sept. 25,2003); EPA, supra note 52.
56. A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 136 (1962) (1920).
57. See, e.g., Hahn, supra note 55, at 379-80.
58. Baumol and Oates show that, under conditions of uncertainty in either marginal
costs or marginal social damages of pollution control, either a pollution tax or a tradable
permit program may yield higher expected social welfare, depending on the shapes of the
marginal cost and marginal social damages curves. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E.
OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 61-75 (2d ed. 1993).
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FIGURE 1: Theoretical Equivalence of a Pollution Tax (c*)
Pollution Cap (q*)

and

Any point on the marginal cost function can be mapped to a
unique level of water quality and marginal cost; this is shown for one
point where c* maps to q*. For this point, a pollution cap can be
represented by vertical line at q* while the equivalent pollution tax could
be represented by a horizontal line at c*, each intersecting the marginal
cost function at the same point. For a given pollution tax (c*), the firm
would have an incentive to reduce pollution as long as the pollution tax
exceeded control costs, i.e., up to the point q*. This level of water quality
could also be achieved by directly specifying a pollution cap at q*, in
which case cost minimizing behavior at the firm would dictate a
marginal cost of pollution reduction at c*, or a level equal to the
pollution tax. Despite the theoretical equivalence of pollution taxes and
"cap and trade" programs, a number of practical advantages are often
cited in favor of tradable permits, especially when attaining ambient
standards is an overriding consideration, as is the case with the TMDL
program.
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Tradable Permits
The theoretical underpinnings of a tradable permits system have
been traced to Coase, 9 who, in his classic work, The Problem of Social Cost,
forcefully argued the importance of clear liability rules and bargaining
between parties to achieve socially desirable levels of harmful effects.'
Practical applications of Coase's basic premise were extended to air61 and
water pollution. 62 Whereas Coase envisioned the bargaining of social
harms between the producer and recipient of those harms resulting in an
efficient outcome regardless of who was responsible, Dales set out the
parameters of the type of "cap and trade" program in widespread use
today. The basic components of the program involve setting a cap on the
total waste load, issuing emission permits, the aggregate of which equals
the cap, and allowing the sale and purchase of permits among polluters.
Marketable credits are formed when dischargers with low mitigation
costs reduce loads below permitted levels. These credits can in turn be
sold to entities with high mitigation costs such that both parties gain,
and savings in meeting the total waste load are achieved.
Historical precedent for tradable permit systems in the United
States and other countries is found in the allocation of natural resources,
e.g., water supply and fisheries.' Acceptance of the tradable permits in
the United States for pollution control can be traced to the introduction
of "pollution offsets" by the U.S. Congress in 1977, which opened the
door to emissions trading in the air arena.' In the years since, tradable
emission permit systems have been successfully implemented at the
federal level for the lead phaseout program, to reduce ozone-depleting
chemicals under the Montreal Protocol, and for the sulfur allowance
program." A number of programs have also been developed at the state
level. Emissions trading for air pollution has generally been deemed
quite successful. Trading of sulfur dioxide emissions, for instance, is
estimated to have resulted in a 13 percent reduction in compliance costs
while producing health related benefits of nearly $570 million in 1995.66

59. See, e.g., Tom Tietenberg, Introduction, in EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAMS, VOLUME II
XV, xvI (Tom Tietenberg ed., 2001).
60. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 8 (1960).
61. Thomas D. Crocker, The Structuringof Atmospheric Pollution Control Systems, in THE
ECONOMICS OF AIR POLLUTION 61-86 (Harold Wolozin ed., 1966).
62. J.H. Dales, Land, Water, and Ownership, 1 CANADIAN J. ECON., 791, 791-804 (1968).
63. See generally Bonnie G. Colby, Cap and Trade Policy Challenges: A Tale of Three
Markets, 76 LAND ECON. 638 (2000).
64. See Tietenberg, supra note 54, at 3.
65. Id. at 3-6.
66. DALLAS BURTRAW & ERIN MANSUR, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, THE EFFECTS OF
TRADING AND BANKING IN THE SO, ALLOWANCE MARKET 2, Discussion Paper No. 99-25
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The use of tradable permits for water quality control is of recent origin. In
1992, no water effluent markets were reported to exist, 67 whereas several
functioning trading programs were in operation by the late 1990s."
The advantages of "cap and trade" programs relative to
pollution taxes are, first and perhaps foremost, that a new pollution tax
on industry may be politically unacceptable whereas the issuing of
permits produces a potentially valuable property right.69 Second, under
conditions of uncertainty, a permit system would guarantee the
attainment of the specified pollution level, whereas a large degree of
guesswork would be involved in setting the appropriate tax level.
Several adjustments to the tax might be required in finding the level that
would produce the sought-after level of pollution control. Third, the
amount of pollution reduction achieved by a given pollution tax is also
unstable over time. Other things being equal, economic growth would
generate increased emissions roughly proportional to increased
production, as more pollution producing products and services were
demanded and produced.' On the other hand, given expected advances
in technology, levels of pollution might decrease if more cost-effective
pollution technology were implemented over time.7' In sum, while
pollution taxes and tradable permits each have relative advantages,
(1999), availableat http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-99-25.pdf (last visited Sept. 25,
2003).
67. Zach Willey, Behind Schedule and Over Budget: The Case of Markets, Water, and
Environment, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 391,394 (1992).
68. See generally ENVIRONOMICS, A SUMMARY OF U.S. EFFLUENT TRADING AND OFFSET
PRojEcTs (1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/traenvm.
pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2003) (of the 37 trading and offset programs summarized by
Environomics, eleven were well along in being implemented, with trades under way or
completed; five had specific trading mechanisms approved and were very near
implementation; six had completed the development and program approval process, but
no specific trades had yet been identified; 12 were in various stages short of program
approval, including study, discussion, planning and/or development,; one was exclusively
a study; and two were inactive or discontinued); see also EPA, supra note 52.
69. See generally Tietenburg, supra note 54.
70. Let L* be the initial pollutant load produced by a firm before reduction efforts, L be
the load produced after reduction efforts, and C be the cost of load reduction. Assuming a
linear marginal cost of load reduction, C = a(L* - L), and that initial load is proportional to
production (X), L* = bX, then C = a(bX - L). Given a pollution load tax of t, the firm will
seek to reduce loads to such a level that its own pollution reduction efforts, at the margin,
equal the tax, thus t = C = a(bX - L). Solving for the equilibrium load, L = bX - t/a. This
expression shows that ending load (L) is more than proportional to production (X), and
asymptotically proportional, for a given load tax (t). On the other hand, if a load cap (D) is
imposed, then C = abX - aD, showing that load reduction costs are more than proportional
to production and asymptotically proportional.
71. For the equations in the preceding footnote, cleaner production technology would
be represented by a lower value for coefficient b, while reduced costs for removing load
would be represented by a lower value for a. Both of these changes would reduce both
costs and loads for the pollution tax scenario.
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tradable permit systems are generally considered preferable when
achieving quantitative pollution targets is the paramount consideration.
Tradable effluent permits, thus, are conceptually well suited to achieving
TMDL objectives.
Despite the flexibility of implementation measures inherent in
TMDLs, TMDL allocations may not exhibit the greatest degree of costeffectiveness. This can be attributed to the manner in which TMDL
allocations are decided and, as previously discussed, equity issues. A
tradable permit system, however, holds the promise of reallocating any
initial set of load assignments such that a least cost (or lower cost)
allocation is attained. Whether or not a tradable permit system, in
practice, is more efficient than its absence depends on the level of
transactions costs relative to the gains from trade. In general, a trading
system is deemed advisable only if the benefits from trading exceed
associated transactions costs. Transactions costs include the costs to
industry of quantifying their mitigation costs; finding trading partners;
initiating a trade; and bargaining as well as administrative costs, often
borne by the public, of setting up and maintaining a market for pollution
credits. If load allocations and implementation strategies are initially
made in a relatively efficient manner, there is little room for additional
savings.
Trading has the most potential where there are large differences
between marginal pollution control costs and potentially large amounts
of pollution credits that can be traded. For these reasons, some
researchers see the greatest potential in trades between point and
nonpoint sources, since the cost of nonpoint mitigation is often believed
to be much less than that of point source mitigation.7 Point/nonpoint
source trading, however, entails an additional set of challenges including
the monitoring and measurement of nonpoint pollution and uncertainty
regarding the effectiveness of nonpoint controls 3
Effluent trading is most appropriate for water bodies where
pollutants are well mixed. If pollutants are not well mixed, e.g., a
situation likely to occur in a stream or river, and several points in the
water body are used to evaluate effectiveness, conditions to trading may
need to be applied such that improvements in one area do not lead to
unacceptable degradation in other areas. For this reason, it is likely that
sale of pollution credits to downstream entities would be more likely

72. See generally DAVID LETSON ET AL., POINT-NONPOINT SOURCE TRADING FOR MANAGING AGRICULTURAL POLLUTANT LOADINGS: PROSPECTS FOR COASTAL WATERSHEDS (U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRIC., AcRic. ECON. REP. NO. 674,1993); David Letson, Point/Nonpoint Source
Pollution Reduction Trading:An Interpretive Survey, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 219 (1992).
73. See generally LETSON, supra note 72; Kurt Stephenson et al., Watershed-basedEffluent
Trading: The Nonpoint Source Challenge,16 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 412 (1998).
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than upstream purchases because upstream purchases and subsequent
emissions may subject more river miles to impairment, whereas
downstream purchases may not.74 Thus, the spatial attributes that often
characterize water pollution pose challenges to the development of
viable markets and trading programs and reflect the fact that pollution in
water bodies is generally more localized and spatially isolated than for
air sheds. The potential for viable water pollution trading programs
depends on a number of site-specific factors, many of them dictated by
nature. Under conducive circumstances, a properly structured trading
program can be a potentially useful tool for achieving cost-effective
water pollution control, either within or outside the TMDL process.
Having achieved notable successes in the air arena, economists
and policy makers have investigated the potential of applying the
tradable permit concept to water pollution control, and several programs
have been developed. 7 In 1996, EPA issued a Draft Framework for
Watershed-Based Trading, which was designed to promote, encourage,
and facilitate trading wherever possible provided that equal or greater
76
water pollution control can be attained for an equal or lower cost. This
Policy.
Trading
was followed in January 2003 by a Water Quality
Originally planned to be included in the impaired waters (TMDL) rule,
EPA broadened the scope of the program to all waters and promulgated
the policy in national guidance. 7 EPA's Water Quality Trading Policy was
designed to provide guidance for state agencies in developing and
implementing trading programs particularly for nutrients and sediments
either within or outside of TMDL programs.m EPA believes there is
substantial potential for reducing the cost of CWA compliance through
trading, estimating that "flexible approaches to improving water quality
could save $900 million annually compared to the least flexible
approach. "8

74. Phosphorus, for instance, is a conservative element (i.e., it does not volatilize).
Since most surface waters are phosphorus limited, discharge into a stream would
potentially impair all downstream river miles from the discharge point.
75. See ENvIRoNoMIcs, supra note 68; EPA, supra note 52.
76. EPA, PUB. No. EPA 800-R-96-001, DRAFT FRAMEWORK FOR WATERSHED-BASED
TRADING, ii, xiv (1996), at http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/framwork.pdf (last
visited Sept. 27, 2003).
77. EPA, FINAL WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY (2003), at http://www.epa.gov/
owow/watershed/trading/finalpolicy2003.htnl (last visited Sept. 24, 2003).
78. Inside Washington Publishers, EPA Will Expand Water Trading Program in NonBinding Guidance, 23 INSIDE E.P.A. WEEKLY REPORT 88 (Mar. 22, 2002).
79. See generally EPA, supra note 77.
80. EPA, supra note 77, at 2 (citing EPA, PUB No. EPA 841-D-01-003, THE NATIONAL
COSTS OF THE TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD PROGRAM (DRAFT REPORT) (2001)).
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A controversial issue in EPA's Water Quality Trading Policy is the
inclusion of nonpoint sources in addition to point sources.8 ' EPA does
not have formal authority to regulate nonpoint source dischargers under
the CWA, nor can most states regulate nonpoint sources under state
statutes, instead relying on voluntary or incentive-based mechanisms.82
EPA indicates that TMDL point source waste load allocations and
nonpoint source load allocations should be used as a baseline for the
generation of pollution reduction credits.8 Nonpoint sources, thus, might
produce and sell pollution reduction credits in exchange for adopting
land management practices that reduce expected loads below the TMDL
baseline. Because nonpoint sources, however, are generally not
prohibited from engaging in practices that might increase nonpoint
loads, the purchase of credits to engage in such practices would
generally not be required. At a minimum, it would be very challenging,
both politically and legally, to require that another entity reduce loads
based on a nonpoint source's unilateral decision to adopt load-increasing
practices.8
A second problem in allowing trades between point and
nonpoint sources involves uncertainties in measuring nonpoint loads;
uncertainties in determining, a priori, what load reductions will be for
nonpoint best management practices under a given set of conditions; and
uncertainties in the timing of nonpoint source loads, which are weather
dependent. EPA has suggested a number of approaches to compensate
for nonpoint source uncertainty. These include monitoring to verify load
reductions, using a greater than 1:1 trading ratio between nonpoint and
point sources, using conservative assumptions, retiring a percentage of
nonpoint source reductions for each transaction, and establishing a
reserve pool of credits to compensate for unanticipated shortfalls.8
Finally, biophysical analyses of nutrient loads indicate that gross
loads are often poor measures of impairment because significant
differences in the timing and character of point source versus nonpoint
source loads render them fundamentally non-equivalent from an
impairment standpoint.8
81. Id. at 9.
82. The CWA expressly excludes agricultural storm water discharges from point
source status. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2000). Most
states with delegated authority to implement the NPDES program have also adopted this
stance.
83. EPA, supra note 77, at 5.
84. This nonpoint source "loophole" is not only a potential pitfall for water quality
trading programs, but for the TMDL program, generally.
85. EPA, supra note 77, at 9.
86. For instance, stream impairment may critically depend on the timing of pollutant
discharges. A small nutrient load discharged on a continuous basis, e.g., from a wastewater
treatment plant, generally produces greater impairment than a much larger load
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Despite recent efforts by EPA and some states to encourage the
implementation of watershed trading, programs have been developed at
relatively few locations and trading within these programs has been
limited, such that few examples of successful trades can be found. It
remains to be seen whether vigorous implementation of the TMDL
program, alongside official federal and state endorsement and
encouragement of effluent trading, will greatly increase the use of
7
trading as suggested by EPA, or if spatial and administrative challenges
will continue to limit its adoption to a very small percentage of impaired
or potentially impaired waters.
CASE STUDY: NORTH BOSQUE RIVER TMDLS
The following case study provides an example of an economic
analysis that was performed in conjunction with an actual TMDL.
Formal economic investigations within the context of TMDL decision
making are, at present, rare. In cases where impairment is attributable to
several sources or several viable control measures are available,
however, a cost-effectiveness analysis of control measures may
potentially identify significant cost savings in meeting TMDL targets.
Background
The North Bosque River, located in north central Texas, flows
through six small communities ranging in population from 500 to 16,000,
before draining into Lake Waco, a drinking water source for
approximately 150,000 people located in and around the City of Waco.
The headwater area of the North Bosque River basin is located in the
state's top dairy production region. An estimated 43,000 dairy cows at
approximately 106 dairies are located within the watershed. Although
comprising only three percent of the land area, dairy waste application
fields (WAFs) contribute an estimated 35 percent of soluble phosphorus
discharged over a short period of time, e.g., storm runoff of nutrients from agricultural
land. See, e.g., Keith Keplinger & Ron Jones, Socio-Economic and Biophysical Challenges to
Achieving Clean Water Through TMDLs: Two Texas Examples, 1 WATER RESOURCES IMPACT,
Nov. 1999, at 15. Fred Lee writes, "It is extremely important that pollutant-trading
programs be based on available forms of nutrients and not on total nutrients, which
include large amounts of unavailable nutrients. Numerous technically invalid pollutanttrading programs have been developed, which incorporate trades of discharge of
unavailable nutrients for discharge of available nutrients." G. Fred Lee, Evaluating Nitrogen
and Phosphorus Control in Nutrient TMDLs, 3 STORMWATER (Jan./Feb. 2002), available at
http://www.forester.net/sw_0201_evaluating.html. It is possible that impairment units
other than loads, e.g., time-weighted concentration units, could be traded, although there is
little evidence that such scenarios have been explored.
87. EPA, supra note 52, at 99-100.
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loadings to the watershed.8 Wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) in
the communities along the North Bosque River also provide a significant
portion of watershed phosphorus loads and contribute disproportionately to instream concentrations. Elevated levels of soluble
phosphorus in lakes and streams can lead to accelerated eutrophication,
a condition characterized by excessive algal growth and associated
effects such as fish kills and unpleasant taste and odor. Sporadic algal
blooms and associated taste and odor problems in drinking water from
the lake have long concerned the City of Waco and have focused
attention on the North Bosque River as a possible source of impairment.
Since 1992, when the Texas Commission on Environmental
Quality (TCEQ)f first compiled biannual 303(d) lists, the North Bosque
River has been included on the state's impaired waters list. In the 1998
list as well as former lists, the TCEQ found the river impaired under
narrative water quality criteria related to excessive aquatic plant
growth.' Instream bioassays conducted in 1998 provided strong
evidence that phosphorus was the limiting nutrient for algal growth
under most conditions. 9' Loading studies revealed that WAFs and
municipal WWTPs were the major controllable sources of phosphorus. 9
Additional research indicated that soluble phosphorus, measured as
soluble reactive phosphorus (SRP), was statistically better correlated to
algal levels than total phosphorus.9
The Bosque River Advisory Committee (BRAC) was formed to
comply with Texas's TMDL public participation requirements, while a
technical work group consisting of university and public agency
scientists was assembled to provide technical support to the BRAC. The
full BRAC or its subcommittees met a total of 20 times between February
1998 and August 2000 but did not reach consensus and, consequently,

88. ANNE MCFARLAND & LARRY HAUCK, TEX. INST. FOR APPLIED ENVTL. RESEARCH,
PUB. No. PR 99-11, EXISTING NUTRIENT SOURCES AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE BOSQUE RIVER

WATERSHED, i-ii (1999).
89. Effective September 1, 2002, the former Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission (TNRCC) formally changed its name to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality.
90.

TEX. NAT. RESOURCES CONSERVATION COMM'N, Two TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY

LOADS FOR PHOSPHORUS IN THE NORTH BOSQUE RIVER 2 (2001). The North Bosque River is
also listed on Texas's 303(d) lists for impairments other than excessive aquatic plant
growth; the TMDL, however, is only for phosphorus.

91. Marty Matlock et al., Development and Application of a Lotic Ecosystem Trophic Status
Index, 42 TRANSACTIONS AM. SOC'Y. AGRIC. ENG'RS. 651,651-54 (1999).
92.
93.

MCFARLAND & HAUCK, supra note 88, at i.
RICHARD L. KIESLING ET AL., TEX. INST. FOR APPLIED ENVTL. RESEARCH, PUB. No.

TRO107, NUTRENT TARGETS FOR LAKE WACO AND NORTH BOSQUE RIVER: DEVELOPING
ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION CRITERIA 3-4 (2001).
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provided no recommendations to the TCEQ on key TMDL targets or
allocations.
In February 2001, the TCEQ promulgated TMDLs for
94
phosphorus in the North Bosque River, setting as its endpoint a
significant reduction in SRP average annual loading and annual average
concentrations at various sites. The numeric statement of this goal was to
reduce average total-annual loading of SRP by approximately 50 percent
for the entire North Bosque River watershed. Numeric reductions in SRP
loads and concentrations, thought to be achievable based on computer
simulations, were quantified in the TMDLs. Because of the TMDLs'
emphasis on reducing SRP concentrations as well as loads, the economic
analysis considered reductions in both SRP loads and concentrations as
equally important dual goals.95
Methodology
A series of computer simulations were conducted using the Soil
96
and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) to simulate baseline conditions
and the implementation of several control measures designed to reduce
SRP loads and concentrations. Baseline and P control scenarios were
simulated assuming effluent discharges from WWTPs and cow numbers
at permitted levels.97 Implementation costs at the watershed level for P
control scenarios were also estimated based on fully permitted levels.
The baseline scenario simulated dairy waste application at the
nitrogen rate and nutrient concentrations in WWTP effluent at current

94. TEx. NAT. RESOURCES CONSERVATION COMM'N, supranote 90, at 2.
95. Phosphorus loadings from WAFs and WWTPs vary markedly in character and
timing. Large rainfall events cause runoff from WAFs, producing large but infrequent
phosphorus (P) loads to the river. By contrast, annual P loads for WWTPs are small
compared to those of WAFs but contribute disproportionately to instream time-weighted
concentrations, due to the continuous release of effluent.
96. SWAT, developed by the USDA Agricultural Research Service, is a continuoustime, long-term, simulation model designed to predict the impact of management on water,
sediment, and agricultural chemical yields in large ungauged basins. See generally Jeffery G.

Arnold et al., Large Area HydrologicModeling and Assessment-Part1: Model Development, 34
J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 73 (1998); model documentation is provided in SUSAN L.
NEITSCH ET AL., USDA AGRIC. RESEARCH SERV., GRASSLAND SOIL AND WATER RESEARCH
LAB., SOIL AND WATER ASSESSMENT TOOL USER'S MANUAL, VERSION 2000 (2002), available at

http://ftp.brc.tamus.edu/pub/swat/doc/swatuserman.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2003).
97. Simulating fully permitted levels may satisfy future growth requirement for
TMDLs, since fully permitted cow numbers and WWTPs flows are not anticipated for
many years. As of year 2000, the aggregate annual discharge at the North Bosque WWTPs
was 57 percent of permitted levels while actual dairy cow numbers in the watershed were
63 percent of permitted levels.
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median values. Three dairy Best Management Practices (BMPs) were
simulated: (1) haul out of all solid dairy manure (haul out), (2)
application of manure at the crop P requirement rate (P rate),9 and (3) a
reduction of dietary P in animal feed (P diet). m A reduction of total P in
the effluent of six WWTPs discharging into the North Bosque River to
one mg/l and two combined strategies were also simulated. Combined
strategy I simulated simultaneous adoption of the P rate, P diet, and P
reduction at WWTPs. In addition to these measures, combined strategy II
assumed that WAFs were limited to permitted areas and that excess
manure would be hauled out of the watershed. 0' Santhi et al. provide
additional methodological details.'O
Three sites on the North Bosque River were analyzed: Stephenville, above Meridian, and Valley Mills, which were chosen to represent
the headwater area, a site approximately midway down the watershed,
and the most downstream site, respectively. Simulations for existing
conditions, reported in the North Bosque River TMDLs, indicated that
loads must be reduced by an average of 50 percent and concentrations by
an average of 49 percent from current levels in order to reach the
numeric targets.ln To achieve the same numeric targets from the fully
permitted levels, however, SRP loads must be reduced by an average of
65 percent and SRP concentrations by an average of 70 percent.
98. Grab samples at WWTP outfalls between 1993 and 2002 indicate median total P
concentrations in effluent ranging between 2.2 mg/1 and 3.7 mg/1 for the six Bosque
WWTPs. KEITH KEPLINGER ET AL., TEX. INST. FOR APPLIED ENVTL. RESEARCH, PUBL'N. No.
TR0312 (2003), ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF PHOSPHORUS CONTROL
AT NORTH
BOSQUE RIVER WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANTS 13, available at
http://tiaer6.tarleton.edu/pdf/TR0312.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2003).
99. Published P rates are designed to supply crops with amounts of P equal to plant
uptake requirements plus unavoidable losses to soil and water. P rates for manure
application are typically several times less than nitrogen (N) based rates because the N:P
ratio for crop requirements is several times higher than the N:P ratio of most manures.
100. The P diet BMP assumes a reduction of total P in lactating cow diets from 0.53
percent to 0.40 percent of dry matter, which is considered to more than meet phosphorus
requirements for dairy cattle in the region. Dietary phosphorus in excess of requirements
has been shown to have no beneficial effect on animal health or production.
101. This additional assumption requires that 59 percent of manure is hauled out of the
watershed, since existing WAFs can accommodate only 41 percent of manure when applied
at the P rate.
102. C. SANTHI ET AL., TEX. INST. FOR APPLIED ENVTL. RESEARCH, BLACKLAND RESEARCH
& EXTENSION CTR., TEXAS AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION, BRC REPORT No. 01-34,
USDA LAKE WACO/BoSQUE RIVER INITIATIVE: WATER QUALITY MODELING OF BOSQUE RIVER
WATERSHED USING SWAT FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF PHOSPHORUS CONTROL STRATEGIES
(2000).
103. Average percent reductions reported in the North Bosque TMDLs and in this
report are the unweighted average of percent reductions needed at each site to achieve
numeric SRP load and concentration targets. SRP concentrations are average annual timeweighted concentrations, i.e., means of average annual daily concentrations. See TEX. NAT.
RESOURCES CONSERVATION COMM'N, supra note 90, at 3.
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Control measure effectiveness was calculated in terms of
progress toward numeric targets and reported as a percentage in order
to shift focus from absolute magnitudes of SRP loads and concentrations,
which vary by orders of magnitude among the three sites, to progress
1
toward TMDL numeric targets. " Effectiveness measures for the three
sites were averaged (unweighted) to arrive at reported composite
effectiveness measures for each control scenario.
Costs of the haul out and P rate dairy BMPs were estimated
using the Farm Economic Model.In The economic benefits of reducing
dietary P in cow diets were based on the prices and quantity changes of
dicalcium phosphate and crushed limestone such that the existing
calcium and reduced phosphorus requirements were met. The cost of
implementing P reduction technology at six WWTPs located on the
North Bosque River, such that total ambient P concentrations in effluent
would meet a one mg/i limit, was estimated based on a site-specific
engineering study." Cost-effectiveness ratios for control scenarios were
calculated by dividing control measure costs by scenario effectiveness.
Cost-effectiveness ratios, thus, represent the cost of attaining a one
percent improvement in effectiveness for P loads and concentrations.
Results
For each control measure and the combined strategies, Table 1
reports estimated annualized cost, environmental effectiveness, and costeffectiveness ratios. Costs of the combined strategies are less than a
summation of the costs of their components because savings are realized
when the P rate BMP is combined with the reduced P diet. Haul off is the
most expensive scenario considered, followed by P rate and P reduction
at WWTPs. The P diet BMP produces financial benefits because dairy
producers are able to reduce or eliminate the use of supplemental dietary
P, which is typically the second most expensive component in lactating
cow diets.

104. For example, if an SRP concentration for the baseline scenario is simulated at 80
parts per billion (ppb), the numeric target is 30 ppb, and a control scenario reduces the SRP
concentration from 80 to 60 ppb, then the control measure reduces SRP concentrations by
20 ppb while a reduction of 50 ppb is needed to achieve the numeric target. Hence, the
effectiveness measure for the control strategy (progress toward the target) is reported as
20/50 or 40 percent.
105. The Farm Economic Model is described in EDWARD OSEI ET AL., TEX. INST. FOR
APPLIED ENvTL. RESEARCH, PUB. No. PROO02, LIVESTOCK AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A
NATIONAL PILOT PROJECT; ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL MODELING USING CEEOT 21
(2000), availableat http://tiaer6.tarleton.edu/pdf/PR0002.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2003).
106. CAMP DRESSER & MCKEE, INC., NORTH BOSQUE RIVER PHOSPHORUS REMOVAL STUDY
FOR SIX WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANTS (2001).
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Table 1. Annual Cost, Environmental Effectiveness, & Cost-effectiveness
Ratios of Phosphorus Control Measures, North Bosc ue River
Combined
Dairy BMPs
WWTP
Strategies
Haul
I mg/
Off
Annualized Cost ($1,000)

Environmental Effectiveness
Loads (% reduction)
Concentrations (% reduction)

P Rate P Diet

TP

Ia

4,656

2,964

(1,252)

534

2,574

4,117

68
12

41
6

21
3

29
77

72
84

87
87

69

73

(59)

18

36

47

399

511

(361)

7

31

48

Cost-Effectiveness Ratios
Loads ($1000/%

Effectiveness)
Conc. ($1000/%
Effectiveness)

Combined strategy I simulates simultaneous adoption of the P rate, P diet, and P
reduction at WWTPs. bIn addition to the control actions in combined strategy I, combined
strategy II simulates that waste application fields are limited to permitted areas and that excess
manure is hauled out of the watershed.

Focusing on the environmental effectiveness of individual
control measures, the study concluded that the haul out scenario is the
most effective measure for reducing SRP loads (reducing loads by 68
percent), followed by P rate (-41 percent), P reduction at WWTPs (-29
percent), and P diet (-21 percent). The relative effectiveness of control
measures in reducing SRP concentrations, however, is quite different.
Results indicate that P reduction at WWTPs is by far the most effective
control measure for reducing SRP concentrations
(reducing
concentrations by 77 percent), followed by haul out (-12 percent), P rate
(-6 percent), and P diet (-3 percent). P reduction at WVVTPs is simulated
to be more than six times as effective in reducing SRP concentrations as
the haul out scenario. The haul out scenario, however, is more than twice
as effective in reducing SRP loads than P reduction at WWTPs.
Theory indicates that the cost of achieving environmental targets
can be minimized by applying the most cost-effective measures first,
followed by less cost-effective measures, until targets are reached.
Following this procedure, the reduced P diet would be the first
candidate for inclusion into a TMDL implementation strategy because it
saves producers money while reducing SRP loads and concentrations: a
classic win-win scenario. P reduction at WWTPs would be the next
candidate for consideration because its cost-effectiveness ratios for both
SRP loads and concentrations are lower than those of the remaining
control measures. The simultaneous adoption of these two control
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measures, however, would not come close to achieving either the SRP
load or concentration targets. °7
Effectiveness values reported in Table 1 indicate that the
combined strategies come closer to meeting numeric SRP load and
concentration targets than any individual measure but still do not reach
targets, which would be indicated by a value of 100. Combined strategy
I, the most intensive of the scenarios considered, comes closest to
meeting targets. Simulation results indicate that combined strategy II
achieves 87 percent of both SRP load and concentration reductions
needed to achieve numeric targets. As previously indicated, the baseline
for this analysis assumes dairy cow numbers and discharges at WWTPs
at permitted levels. If there were little or no future growth within the
time frame of the TMDL, then adoption of combined scenario II would
likely come close to or meet numeric targets1 0 Thus, an implementation
strategy approximating that of combined strategy II would appear to be
needed to approach or possibly reach the numeric statement of the
TMDLs' end points.
Discussion
In the presence of alternatives for achieving TMDL targets, costs
can be reduced by implementing more cost-effective control strategies.
This analysis suggests that the ability to substantially reduce costs for the
North Bosque TMDLs is very limited because (1) both SRP loads and
concentrations are targeted and (2) the levels at which those targets are
set. Results indicate that all of the control measures considered would
need to be implemented in order to approach or reach numeric TMDL
targets for SRP loads and concentrations. These results are a reminder
that the application of cost-effectiveness analysis to TMDL control
alternatives may or may not reveal more efficient TMDL allocations.
Nonetheless, a more complete understanding of control measure costs
relative to their effectiveness provided useful input into the North
Bosque TMDL deliberations.1+

107. A scenario representing the combined implementation of the P diet in combination
with P reduction at WWTPs was not simulated, but effectiveness would necessarily be less
than that of combined strategy I.
108. Simulations using current conditions for the baseline were analyzed for TMDL
committee deliberations, but a consistent and complete set of "current condition"
simulations was not achieved and therefore is not presented.
109. This is not to say that the economic efficiency of proposed control strategies played
a dominant role in discussions or in final TMDL allocations. Assessing the goals of
individual TMDL stakeholder participants, TMDL committee dynamics, and agency
behavior is beyond the scope of this article.
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Interestingly, a post-TMDL analysis of phosphorus control
focusing just on North Bosque River WWTPs revealed that up to
$152,000 could be saved annually by allowing WWTPs to trade
phosphorus credits, rather than mandating that each WWTP reduce its
load by the same percentage. " ° Thus, while the adoption of all control
measures considered appears necessary to achieve TMDL goals, considerable reduction in the costs to WWTPs could be achieved through the
implementation of a phosphorus "cap and trade" program for WWTPs,
assuming that all WWTPs were initially required to meet 1 mg/1 effluent
limits for P. Alternatively, more efficient initial load allocations among
the six North Bosque WWTPs could also achieve an equivalent cost
reduction. While the theoretical post trading load distribution among the
six WWTPs would be the same as a most efficient initial load allocation
(the largest WWTP would make all the reductions), the smaller WWTPS
would not need to buy P credits and, hence, would incur no financial
obligations under an efficient initial load allocation, the entire cost falling
to the largest WWTP.
CONCLUSIONS
The shift of water quality policy from ambient standards to an
effluent-based program with the passage of the 1972 CWA was
consistent with economic rationality. To wit, pre CWA ambient-based
water quality legislation proved infeasible and effete, despite its
theoretical appeal, while, for all its flaws, the effluent-based NPDES
program achieved limited success. While criticized for its theoretical
inefficiency and reliance on prescriptive measures, the efficacy of the
NPDES program lay in its simplicity combined with strong federal
enforcement. Resorting to TMDLs, where effluent standards alone are
inadequate, can also be viewed as economically rational, especially since
nonpoint source pollution is not covered by NPDES. Three reasons can
be provided for the premise that the TMDL program is more
appropriate, economic, and will be more effective than its ambient-based
predecessors: (1) TMDLs are required only where existing water quality
programs have proved inadequate in achieving ambient standards; (2)
advances in science, technology, and environmental economics have
made the ambient-based TMDL approach eminently more feasible today

110. KEPLINGER ET AL., supra note 98, at iii. The analysis of the WWTP control measures
presented in Table 1 assumes that all WWTPs would reduce loads to meet 1 mg/l effluent
levels, while Keplinger et al., id., allow the trading of phosphorus credits within a cap such
that total emissions by all six North Bosque River WWTPs collectively do not exceed the
cap, which is equal to the load that would be produced by all WWTPs reducing loads to
meet the 1 mg/l limit.
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than 30 years ago; and, finally, (3) the TMDL program includes
substantial federal involvement, which was largely absent in earlier
ambient-based programs.
Still, the administration and implementation of TMDLs is time
consuming and expensive, and the supporting science often does not
resolve a great deal of uncertainty in outcomes even with today's most
advanced assessment tools. Estimating the benefits as well as the costs of
the TMDL program is being pursued by EPA. Neither the estimation of
costs nor benefits is required for individual TMDLs, since targets are
based on ambient standards, not economic benefits. A committee formed
by the National Research Council, however, recommends that both the
costs and benefits of various levels of water quality be estimated and
evaluated within UAAs, the procedure that informs the assignment of
designated uses for water bodies."'
Within TMDL deliberations, estimating the costs of control
measures is not only allowed but also encouraged. Numeric water
quality targets are inherently part of the TMDL process and descriptions
of control measures and their effectiveness are required elements in
TMDL implementation plans. For these and other reasons, TMDLs are
natural candidates for the application of cost-effectiveness analysis. Even
if cost-effectiveness
analyses are pursued,
however, equity
considerations or political dynamics may cause recommended or final
TMDL allocations to significantly depart from cost-effective allocations.
Properly structured incentive-based mechanisms, especially marketable
permits, may potentially readjust allocations such that standards can be
met at lower cost. Several "cap and trade" programs for water quality
have been instituted within the last decade with mixed results. The EPA
recently issued a water quality trading policy to encourage and provide
guidance to states in developing and implementing trading programs for
nutrient and sediment loads, and several states have initiated programs.
This official endorsement will likely increase the implementation of
trading programs, although their adoption will be far from universal.
High transactions costs and the dynamic and spatial characteristics of
water quality will limit the potential of successful trading programs to
that portion of water bodies with amenable characteristics.
The North Bosque River TMDLs provide a case study of a formal
economic analysis pursued within a TMDL. A cost-effectiveness analysis
indicated that some of the proposed control measures were much more
effective and cost-effective in reducing phosphorus loads while others
were much more effective and cost-effective in reducing concentrations.
Because reductions of both loads and concentrations were considered

111.

See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supranote 6, at 92.
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equally important dual goals, the analysis indicated that, all proposed
control measures would be needed to approach or meet numeric TMDL
targets. A post-TMDL analysis, however, showed that substantial
savings to North Bosque River WWTPs could accrue if the trading of
phosphorus credits were allowed to meet phosphorous control responsibilities. Alternatively, a more efficient initial allocation of control
responsibility could achieve the same savings, although the entire cost of
phosphorous control would be shifted to the largest WWTP in this case.
Costs and economic efficiency are important considerations for
any policy decision, including individual TMDL allocations and the
TMDL program itself. Although economic considerations were once
deemed relatively unimportant (or even counter-productive) in the
implementation of CWA policy, the flexibility of the TMDL program and
its rise to prominence, in conjunction with a well developed environmental economics field, offers an amenable environment for conducting
cost-effective analyses within individual TMDLs, possibly uncovering
efficiencies. Where conditions are conducive, the trading of marketable
pollution credits may further reduce costs. There is, therefore, great but
heretofore underutilized opportunity to conduct economic analyses
directed specifically at individual TMDLs or as part of TMDL assessments. Revealing control costs and economic efficiencies for control
alternatives does not guarantee ultimate adoption of the most efficient
control strategies, but it does bring critically important information to
bear on TMDL decision making.

